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Abstract
The security π -calculus is a typed version of the asynchronous π -calculus in which the types,
in addition to constraining the input/output behaviour of processes, have security levels associated
with them. This enables us to introduce a range of typing disciplines which allow input or output
behaviour, or both, to be bounded above or below by a given security level. We define typed versions
of may and must equivalences for the security π -calculus, where the tests are parameterised relative
to a security level. We provide alternative characterisations of these equivalences in terms of actions
in context; these describe the actions a process may perform in a given typing environment, assuming
the observer is constrained by a related, but possibly different, environment. The paper also contains
non-interference results with respect to may and must testing. These show that certain form of non-
interference can be enforced using our typing systems.
c© 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The asynchronous π-calculus [3,14] is a simple formalism for describing distributed
processes. It presupposes a set of channel names through which processes communicate.
Thus a?(X) P is a process which inputs some value v on the channel a, and executes the
body P in which X has been substituted by the value v, while output on the same channel
is denoted by a!〈v〉. These two primitives, together with operators for parallelism, |, repeti-
tion, ∗, and channel scoping, (new n) , make the π-calculus a very powerful language. For
example the term P ,
∗ req?(x, y) (new r) s!〈x, r〉 | r?(z) y!〈z〉
describes a process which repeatedly receives a request on the channel req, consisting of
a value, bound to x, and a return channel, bound to y. This value is in turn sent along the
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channel s, presumably serviced by some independent server, together with a private return
channel r , generated specifically for this purpose. A response is awaited from the service,
on the reply channel r , which is then forwarded on the original return channel y.
Numerous typing systems have been developed for this language [19,24,25]. Most are
based on judgements of the form
  P
indicating that the process P is well-typed with respect to the channel environment ,
which associates capabilities with the free channel names of P . Usually these capabilities
are some elaboration of
read capabilities r〈T〉: the ability to read values of type T from a channel.
write capabilities w〈T〉: the ability to write values of type T to a channel.
For example let A denote the tuple type (int,w〈int〉); a value of this type will consist of
a pair, the first element of which is an integer, and the second a channel on which integers
may be written. If  associates the type r〈A〉 with the channel req and the type w〈A〉 with
s, we would expect the above term, P , to be well-typed with respect to . However for this
to be true the local channel r needs to be generated with the write capability w〈int〉, to be
sent along the channel s, and the read capability r〈int〉, which is used by the process itself.
Thus if we were to annotate all bound names and variables with their required types we
would obtain the annotated term
∗ req?(x, y) : A (new r : R) s!〈x, r〉 | r?(z) y!(z) (∗)
where R is the type {w〈int〉, r〈int〉}. This term is well-typed with respect to the above
mentioned environment .
Intuitively the use of types constrain the behaviour of processes, ensuring no misuse
of channels. By defining sophisticated forms of types process behaviour can be more
or less constrained, while at the same time the advantages of well-typing can be pre-
served. For example a form of polymorphism is investigated in [19], while in [12] se-
curity levels are associated with capabilities, to obtain so-called security types. Suppose
we have two security levels, high, denoted by top, and low, denoted by bot. Then we
would have capabilities of the form rtop〈T〉, rbot〈T〉, wtop〈T〉, wbot〈T〉, where T in turn a
security type. By varying the precise definition of a security type we can either implement
resource access control methodologies, or ensure forms of non-interference [2,7,9]. In this
paper we will be concerned with the latter, using a mild variation of the I -types of [12];
essentially types are sets of read/write capabilities, where in addition each capability is
annotated by a security level taken from some complete lattice 〈SL,
,,unionsq, top, bot〉. We
will refer to the asynchronous π-calculus, augmented with these types, as the security
π-calculus.
The statement of non-interference results requires some definition of process behaviour;
intuitively a system is interference-free if its low-level behaviour is independent of changes
to high-level behaviour. The main topic of this paper is an investigation of the notion of
behaviour of process, relative to a security level, for the security π-calculus.
Process behaviour is relative to some typing environment  and therefore we wish to
develop a relation of the form
 σ P  Q
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meaning, intuitively, that in the typing environment , both P and Q exhibit the same
σ -level behaviour. By this we mean that a σ -level observer will be unable to discern
a difference between P and Q. For example low-level observers will be unable to see
any high-level actions performed by P, Q. But more importantly we assume that these
observers are constrained by the typing environment  and therefore actions disallowed by
this environment will also be invisible to observers.
For example suppose the channel a is not in the domain of . Then we would expect
 σ a!〈v〉 | b!〈w〉  b!〈w〉
regardless of the value of σ because no observer, well-typed with respect to , will be able
to interact with P along the channel a. More generally this will also be true if  associates
with a only an output capability. Similarly if  only associates with it an input capability
we will have
 σ Q | a?(x) T  Q
for any process Q.
In this paper we investigate may and must testing equivalences, [10,17] for the security
π-calculus. In particular we give an alternative characterisation of these behavioural equi-
valences which, as might be expected from [10,17], are based on the sequences of actions
that a process can perform. But here these sequences are relative to both a security level
and a typing environment.
Unfortunately the situation is even more complicated, as the typing environment of the
observer and that of the process being observed may not in general be the same. For ex-
ample consider the term P , given in (∗) above. To be well-typed relative to an environment
,  needs to associate appropriate types with the free names of P , namely req and s. Now
consider a computation involving an observer, also well-typed with respect to , interacting
with P . After an interaction on the channel req the process evolves to P1:
(new r : R) s!〈v, r〉 | r?(z) b!(z)
for some value v and channel b sent by the observer. At this stage both the observer
and the observed process P1 can still be typed relative to , as both v and b must have
been known to the observer, and therefore be typeable in . However now the observed
process generates a new channel r, with type R = {r〈int〉,w〈int〉}. But because of the type
associated with s in , r is only sent to the observer with the subtype consisting of the
one capability w〈int〉. Subsequently the observer is working relative to , r :{w〈int〉}, the
environment  augmented with a new entry for r , whereas the observed process is working
with respect to the different environment , r :{r〈int〉,w〈int〉}.
In general the observed process and the observing process will be constrained by related
but different environments.
Our characterisation of the behavioural equivalences will be based on what we call a
Context Labelled Transition System. Here actions take the form
;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′
indicating that in the typing environment  the process P can perform the action µ to inter-
act with some σ -level observer which in turn is typeable in the environment ; this action
may change the typing environments of both the observer and the observed processes, to
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′ and ′ respectively. If the type environments  and  satisfy some minor conditions,
(are compatible), we say that the above judgement is an action in context. May equivalence
will be characterised in terms of appropriate sequences of such actions in context while
must equivalence will also require the development of appropriate notions of acceptance
sets.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we formally define the
syntax of the security π-calculus, together with its (standard) operational semantics. This
is followed, in Section 2.3, with a range of typing systems. In the most straightforward we
have the judgements
  P
where  is a type environment, associating types to channel names and variables. This
means that relative to , P uses its channels correctly as input/output devices, ignoring
their security annotations. We also have judgements of the form
 σ P
which indicates that in addition P uses channels with security level at most σ . Similarly
we have a typing relation
 σ P
indicating that P uses channels with at least security level σ . Indeed we can go further,
designing relations such as  rσ P or  wσ P where the read capabilities or the write
capabilities of processes are independently constrained. For all of these typing relations
Subject Reduction is easily established.
Section 3 is the heart of the paper. First the behavioural preorders and equivalences are
defined, by adapting the standard framework [10,17] to the security π-calculus. We obtain
the relations
 σ P may Q
and
 σ P must Q
indicating that P and Q can not be distinguished, relative to may/must experiments re-
spectively, by any testing process T such that  σ T , that is any test running at security
level at most σ , relative to the type environment. This is followed by an exposition of
the Context LTS, actions in context and their properties. Section 3.3 then contains an
alternative characterisation of may in terms of sequences of actions in context, while
in Section 3.4 we give a much more complicated characterisation of must .
One benefit of having behavioural equivalences relativised to security levels is that non-
interference results can be stated succinctly. Section 4 contains two such statements, and
their proofs. The first gives conditions ensure that
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 σ P may Q implies  σ P |H may Q |K
It turns out to be sufficient to require that the read capabilities of P and Q be bounded
above by σ , that is  rσ P ,Q, and that the write capabilities of H and K be bounded
below by some δ 
 σ , that is  wδ H, K .
This is quite a general non-interference result. For example in the case where Q is P
and K is the empty process 0 we obtain
 σ P may P |H
indicating that, under the conditions of the theorem, the process H can not interfere with
the behaviour of P .
This result is not true for the must equivalence. As explained in Section 4, this is because
our types allow contention between processes running at different security levels over read
access to channels. However by restricting the type system, allowing only single level
types, we show that the same result holds for must ; these types only allow a channel to
be used either for communication between security levels, or for communication within a
given security level, but not both.
The paper ends with a brief survey of related work.
2. The language
In this section we define the language, its operational semantics and the typing system
with which we will be concerned.
2.1. The types
We presuppose a complete lattice 〈SL,
,,unionsq, top, bot〉 of security annotations, ranged
over by σ, ρ, . . . For each σ we assume a set of basic types at that level, of the form Bσ . If
the security annotation is omitted, as in int, then we assume it has security level bot; as we
shall see values of these types are available to all processes. Also, as explained in Section 1,
a σ -level channel type, for channels accessible to processes with security clearance at level
σ , consists of a set of σ -level capabilities, i.e. a subset of Capσ . These may either be a read
capability, of the form rρ〈T〉, for some appropriate ρ and T, or a write capability, of the
form wσ 〈T〉. These capabilities are constrained by consistency requirements. For example
since values with the capability wσ 〈T〉 are written to by σ -level processes we require that
T in turn be a σ -level type.
Types, i.e. sets of capabilities, are also constrained. For simplicity in a given type we
only allow at most one write capability, and for each level σ at most one read capability at
that level. More importantly we ensure that, relative to security levels, only write-ups [2,9]
are allowed by requiring that if wρ〈T〉 and rρ′ 〈S〉 are in a type then ρ 
 ρ′; the additional
constraint that T be a subtype of S is well-known [13,19]. The formal definition is as
follows:
Definition 2.1 (Types, capabilities and subtyping). Let Typeσ , Capσ be the least sets, and
<:, consistent the least relations, which satisfy:
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(RT-BASE)
Bρ ∈ Typeσ ρ 
 σ
(RT-WR)
A ∈ Typeσ
wσ 〈A〉 ∈ Capσ
(RT-WRRD)
S ⊆f in Capσ
S ∈ Typeσ S consistent
(RT-RD)
A ∈ Typeρ
rρ〈A〉 ∈ Capσ σ 
 ρ
(RT-TUP)
Ai ∈ Typeσ (∀i)
(A1, . . . ,Ak) ∈ Typeσ
(U-WR) wσ 〈A〉 <: wσ 〈B〉 if B <: A
(U-RD) rσ 〈A〉 <: rσ 〈B〉 if A <: B
(U-BASE) Bσ <: Bρ if σ 
 ρ
(U-RES) {capi}i∈I <: {cap′j }j∈J if (∀j)(∃i) capi <: cap′j
(U-TUP) (A1, . . . ,Ak) <: (B1, . . . ,Bk) if (∀i) Ai <: Bi
The set of capabilities Cap is consistent if
(a) wσ 〈A〉, wρ〈B〉 ∈ Cap implies σ = ρ and A is B;
(b) rσ 〈A〉, rσ 〈B〉 ∈ Cap implies A is B;
(c) wσ 〈A〉, rρ〈B〉 ∈ Cap implies A <: B.
These types correspond very closely to the I-types of [12]; the rule (RT-RD) ensures
that only write-ups are allowed, from low-level processes to high-level processes. But we
allow multiple read capabilities, which will enable us to be more flexible with respect to
allowing/disallowing reading from a channel at different security levels. However subtyp-
ing is more restrictive; unlike [12] they can only be subtyped at the same security level;
rσ 〈A〉 <: rρ〈B〉 only if σ = ρ. Nevertheless this is compensated for in the existence of
multiple read capabilities.
Example 2.2
• The set {wbot〈int〉, rbot〈int〉, rtop〈int〉} is a bot-level channel type, that is an element of
Typebot; that is channels of this type may be transmitted on bot-level channels. In turn
these channels may be written to by a bot-level process or read by either a bot-level or
a top-level process.
• The type {wbot〈int〉, rtop〈int〉} restricts reading from the channel to top-level processes,
although bot-level ones can write to it.
• The set {wtop〈int〉, rbot〈int〉, rtop〈int〉} is not a valid type as it contains a read capability
at a lower level than its write capability.
• The set {wtop〈int〉, rtop〈int〉} is a top-level type but not a bot-level one; that is, it is in
Typetop but not in Typebot.
Proposition 2.3. For every σ, Typeσ is a preorder with respect to <:, with both a partial
meet operation  and a partial join unionsq.
Proof. The (partial) functions  and unionsq are defined by structural induction on types. They
are determined by the clauses
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rσ 〈A〉  rσ 〈A′〉 = rσ 〈A  A′〉
rσ 〈A〉  rρ〈A′〉 = {rσ 〈A〉, rρ〈A〉}
wσ 〈A〉  wσ 〈A′〉 = wσ 〈A unionsq A′〉
rσ 〈A〉 unionsq rσ 〈A′〉 = rσ 〈A unionsq A′〉
wσ 〈A〉 unionsq wσ 〈A′〉 = wσ 〈A  A′〉
and these definitions are extended homomorphically to tuple types. 
Multiple read capabilities in a type, such as {wbot〈int〉, rbot〈int〉, rtop〈int〉}, allows pro-
cesses at different security levels to read from the same channel. We can eliminate such
contention by using a restricted set of types.
Definition 2.4 (Single-level types). Let SlType be the least set of types obtained by changing
the second condition in the definition of consistent of Definition 2.1 to read:
rρ〈A〉, rσ 〈B〉 ∈ Cap implies ρ = σ and A is B
Note that these types still allow communication from low-level processes to high-level
processes. We leave the reader to check that these types, ordered by <: also has both partial
meet and join operations.
2.2. Syntax and operational semantics
The syntax of the π-calculus, given in Fig. 1, uses a predefined set of names, ranged over
by a, b, . . . and a set of variables, ranged over by x, y, z. Identifiers are either variables or
names. We also assume a set of basic values, ranged over by bv, each of which belong to a
given basic type.
The binding constructs (new a : A) Q and u?(X : A)Q introduce the usual notions of
free names and variables, fn(P ) and fv(P ), respectively, and associated notions of substitu-
tion and α-equivalence, ≡α , are defined as usual. Moreover the typing annotations on the
binding constructs are omitted whenever they do not play a role, as will most occurrences
of the empty process 0.
The behaviour of a process is determined by the interactions in which it can engage. To
define these, we give a labelled transition semantics (LTS) for the language. The set Act of
actions, is defined as follows:
µ ::= Actions
τ Internal action
a?v Input of v on a
(c˜ : C˜)a!v Output of v on a revealing private names c˜ (c˜ ⊆ fn(v))
Visible actions (all except τ ) are ranged over by α, β and if α is an output action we use
E(α) to denote the bound names in α, together with their types: E((c˜ : C˜)a!v) = (c˜ : C˜).
Further, let n(µ) be the set of names occurring in µ, whether free or bound. We say that
the actions ‘a?v’ and ‘(c˜ : C˜)a!v’ are complementary, with α denoting a complement of α.
The LTS is defined in Fig. 2 and for the most part the rules are straightforward; it is
based on the standard operational semantics from [16], to which the reader is referred for
more motivation. Note that in the communication rule (L-COM) it is assumed that α is an
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P,Q ::= Terms
u!〈v〉 Output
u?(X : A) P Input
if u = v then P else Q Matching
(new a : A) P Name creation
P |Q Composition
∗P Replication
0 Termination
X, Y ::= Patterns
x Variable
(X1, . . . , Xk) Tuple
u, v,w ::= Values
bv Base Value
a Name
x Variable
(u1, . . . , uk) Tuple
Fig. 1. Syntax.
(L-OUT)
a!〈v〉 a!v−→ 0
(L-IN)
a?(X) P a?v−→ P {|v/X|}
(L-OPEN)
P (c˜
: C˜)a!v−−−−−→ P ′
(new b : B) P (b : B)(˜c : C˜)a!v−−−−−−−−→ P ′
b /= a
b ∈ fn(v)
(L-COM)
P α−→ P ′, Q α−→ Q′
P |Q τ−→ (new E(α)) (P ′ |Q′)
(L-EQ)
if u = u then P else Q τ−→ P if u = w then P else Q τ−→ Q u = w
(L-CTXT)
P µ−→ P ′
∗P µ−→ ∗P | P ′
P µ−→ P ′
P |Q µ−→ P ′ |Q
Q | P µ−→ Q | P ′
bn(µ) ∈ fn(Q)
P µ−→ P ′
(new a : A) P µ−→ (new a : A) P ′ a ∈ n(µ)
P ≡ Q, Q µ−→ P ′
P µ−→ P ′
The structural congruence axioms:
(S-NEWNEW) (new a)(new b) P ≡ (new b)(new a) P if a = b
(S-NEWPAR) P | (new a) Q ≡ (new a) (P |Q) if a ∈ fn(P )
(S-COMM) P |Q ≡ Q | P
(S-ZERO) P | 0 ≡ P
Fig. 2. Labelled transition semantics.
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output action; we omit the corresponding symmetric rule, in which Q performs the output.
The last part of the rule (L-CTXT) uses a standard structural congruence over terms. This is
defined to be the least equivalence generated by the axioms given in Fig. 2, which extends
≡α and is preserved by the static operators (| and (new a) ). Note that because of this rule
structurally equivalent processes can perform exactly the same set of actions.
We end this subsection with a result which emphasises the asynchrony of message
reception:
Lemma 2.5 (Asynchronous actions). If P (c˜ : C˜)a!v−−−−−→ P ′ then P ≡ (new c˜ : C˜) (a!〈v〉 | P ′).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of P (c˜ : C˜)a!v−−−−−→ P ′. 
2.3. The typing system
A type environment is a finite mapping from identifiers (names and variables) to types.
We adopt some standard notation. For example, let , u : A denote the obvious extension of
; , u : A is only defined if u is not in the domain of . The subtyping relation <: together
with the partial operators  and unionsqmay also be extended to environments. For example  <:
 if for all u in the domain of , (u) <: (u). We will normally abbreviate the simple
environment {u : A} to u : A and moreover use v : A to denote its obvious generalisation to
values; this is only well-defined when the value v has the same structure as the type A.
The first typing system is given in Fig. 3, where the judgements take the form
  P
Intuitively this means that the process P uses all channels as input/output devices in ac-
cordance with their types, as given in . It is the standard typing system for the π-calculus
[13,19] adapted to our types; note that the security levels on the capabilities do not play
any role. The rule (LT-EQ), which uses the partial meet operator on type environments, is
explained in detail in [13], where it is argued to be useful for capability-based type systems,
such as ours. The final premise is assumed to be vacuously true when the augmented
environment does not exist.
We can also design a type inference system which not only ensures that channels are
used according to their types but also controls the security levels of the channels used. One
such system is given in Fig. 4, where the judgements now take the form
 σ P
This indicates that not only is P well-typed as before but in addition it uses channels with
security level at most σ . (This corresponds to the typing system used in [12].) The only
difference is in the input/output rules, where the security level of the channels used are
checked. For example  σ a!〈v〉 only if in  the channel a can be assigned a security level
δ 
 σ , in addition to having the appropriate output capability in .
We can also design a typing system
 σ P
which ensures that P uses channels with security level at least σ . The only change is to
demand in the input/output rules that σ 
 δ:
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(T-ID)
(u) <: A
  u : A
(T-BASE)
bv ∈ Bσ
  bv : Bσ
(T-TUP)
  vi :Ai (∀i)
  (v1, . . . , vk) :(A1, . . . ,Ak)
(T-IN)
,X : A  P
  u : rσ 〈A〉
  u?(X : A) P
(T-OUT)
  u : wσ 〈A〉
  v : A
  u!〈v〉
(T-EQ)
  u : A, v : B
  Q
  {u : B, v : A}  P
  if u = v then P else Q
(T-NEW)
, a : A  P
  (new a : A) P
(T-STR)
  P, Q
  P |Q, ∗P, 0
Fig. 3. Typing rules.
(LT-IN)
,X : A σ P
  u : rδ〈A〉
 σ u?(X : A) P δ 
 σ
(LT-OUT)
  v : A
  u : wδ〈A〉
 σ u!〈v〉 δ 
 σ
(LT-EQ)
  u : A, v : B
 σ Q
  {u : B, v : A} σ P
 σ if u = v then P else Q
(LT-NEW)
, a : A σ P
 σ (new a : A) P
(LT-STR)
 σ P , Q
 σ P |Q, ∗P, 0
Fig. 4. Security typing rules.
(HL-IN)
,X : A σ P
  u : rδ〈A〉
 σ u?(X : A) P σ 
 δ
(HL-OUT)
  v : A
  u : wdelta〈A〉
 σ u!〈v〉 σ 
 δ
We can provide further mix and matches. For example the type system
 rσ P
ensures that all channels from which values are read have a read capability of at most σ ;
the security level of the output channels is unexamined. This system is obtained by using
the rules in the original Fig. 3 but with the rule (T-IN) replaced with (LT-IN); the output
rule is left unchanged. In a similar manner we can define relations  wσ P,  rσ P and
 wσ P .
Theorem 2.6 (Subject Reduction). Let  represent any of the relations, , σ , rσ , rσ ,
wσ ,wσ and suppose   P. Then
• P τ−→ Q implies   Q.
• P a?v−→ Q implies there exists a type A such that rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a) and if   v : A is well-
defined then   v : A  Q.
Moreover δ 
 σ when  is σ or rσ and σ 
 δ if it is σ or rσ.
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• P (c˜ : C˜)a!v−−−−−→ Q implies there exists a type A such that   a : wδ〈A〉, , c˜ : C˜  v : A
and , c˜ : C˜  Q.
Moreover δ 
 σ when  is σ or wσ and σ 
 δ if it is σ or wσ.
Proof. Similar to that of Theorem 3.5 of [12], although in the case of the action a?v, the
conclusion is a little stronger. However the proof is straightforward. For example consider
the case when P is the term a?(X : B) R, the move is a?(X)R a?v−→ R{|v/X|} and  σ P .
From the typing rules we have   a : rδ〈B〉 for some δ 
 σ and ,X : B σ R. From the
former we know that there exists some A <: B such that rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a); from the latter, and
subsumption, we have ,X : A σ R. A standard substitution lemma can now be applied
for any v such that   v : A is well-defined to obtain   v : A σ R{|v/X|}. 
3. Behavioural theories
In this section we develop two behavioural theories of typed processes, based on the
general testing theories of [10,17]. In the first section we adapt the original definitions
from [10,17] to our language. This is followed by a subsection defining the Context LTS
alluded to in the Introduction. Two further subsections use this LTS to determine the may
and must versions of our behavioural equivalence.
3.1. Testing processes
A test or observer is a process with an occurrence of a new reserved resource name ω,
used to report success. We let T to range over tests, with the typing rule  σ ω!〈〉 for all .
When placed in parallel with a process P , a test may interact with P , producing an output
on ω if some desired behaviour of P has been observed. We write
P may T
T | P τ−→∗ R for some R such that R can report success, i.e. R ω!〈〉−→. The stronger relation
P must T
holds when in every computation
T | P τ−→ R1 τ−→ · · · τ−→ Rn τ−→ · · ·
there is some Rk, k ≥ 0, which can report success.
We can obtain a testing based behavioural preorder between processes by demanding
that they react in a similar manner to a given class of tests. Here we choose the class of
tests which are well-typed and use channels from at most a given security level σ ; that is
we require that processes react in the same manner to all tests T such that  σ T .
Definition 3.1 (Testing preorders). We write  σ P ∼may Q if for every test T such that
 σ T , P may T implies Q may T .
Similarly  σ P ∼must Q means that for every such T , P must T implies Q must T .
We use may and must denote the related equivalence relations.
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(C-OUT)
rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a)
;  a!〈v〉 a!v−→σ   v : A;  0 δ 
 σ
(C-IN)
  a : wδ〈B〉
  v : B
;  a?(X : A) P a?v−→σ ;  v : A  P {|v/X|}
δ 
 σ
B <: A
(C-OPEN)
;, b : B  P (c˜)a!v−−−→σ ′;′  P ′
;  (new b : B) P (b)(˜c)a!v−−−−−→σ ′;′  P ′
b /= a
b ∈ fn(v)
(C-RED)
P τ−→ P ′
;  P τ−→σ ;  P ′
(C-EQUIV)
;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′
P ≡ Q
; Q µ−→σ ;′  P ′
(C-CTXT)
;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′
;  ∗P µ−→σ ′;′  ∗P | P ′
;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′
;  P |Q µ−→σ ′;′  P ′ |Q
; Q | P µ−→σ ′;′ Q | P ′
bn(µ) ∈ fn(Q)
, a : A;, a : A  P µ−→σ ′, a : A;′, a : A  P ′
;  (new a : A) P µ−→σ ;′  (new a : A) P ′ a ∈ n(µ)
Fig. 5. Context LTS.
So for example setting σ to be bot,  bot P may Q means that in the type environment
, P and Q are indistinguishable by low-level observers, from a may testing point of
view.
3.2. The context labelled transition system
It is well-known [10,17] that testing equivalences are closely related to the ability of
processes to perform sequences of actions. We have explained in the Introduction that here
we need to relativise these sequences to security levels and to a pair of typing environments,
one for the observer and one for the process being observed.
The rules for the Context LTS, are given in Fig. 5. The judgements take the form
;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′
This judgement should be understood as expressing the fact that:
The process P , in its current type environment , when run concurrently with any
observing process T such that  σ T , can perform the action µ. This will transform
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P into P ′ and may also transform the current type environment to ′ and that of the
observing process to ′.
Note that judgements are a more explicit form of the typed actions, developed in [11]
for π-calculus. These actions can take three forms:
internal move: ;  P τ−→σ ;  P ′ This corresponds to an internal move by P ,
which does not depend on its environment. These moves are completely determined by
the semantics given in Fig. 2; see the rule (C-RED).
input move: ;  P a?v−→σ ;′  P ′ Here the observing process sends a value v to P
along the channel a. The type environment of the observing process does not change,
but that of P may be augmented by knowledge of v of which it was previously unaware.
An appropriate write capability on a is required of the observing process for the action
to take place; see the rule (C-IN).
output move: ;  P (c˜)a!v−−−→σ ′;′  P ′ Here P sends a value v along the channel a to
the observing process, and typically the observers type environment  will be augmen-
ted with knowledge of v. However the type environment of P may also be increased by
associating with the new identifiers (c˜) their declared types; this is implemented in the
rule (C-OPEN). Here an appropriate read capability is required of the observing process
for the action to take place; see the rule (C-OUT).
The rules in Fig. 5 are straightforward and only the first two deserve comment. (C-IN)
states that a?(X : A) P can receive v along a from a σ -level observer provided the observer
has a write capability on a at a level at most σ , and it has the value v at an appropriate
type. (C-OUT) is more subtle. In principle the observer could receive v from the observed
process a!〈v〉 at any type B such that   a : rδ〈B〉, where δ 
 σ . However to eliminate
much potential non-determinism in the LTS our rule dictates that for a given δ 
 σ the
observer receives v at the minimum B such that   a : rδ〈B〉; this is the type A such that
rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a).
Note that in the output actions we do not record the types of the bound names. These we
only required in Fig. 2 in order to implement communication between processes; see the
rule (L-COM). Here we do not need to formalise, at least directly, communication between
the process P and its observer.
We can describe precisely the form these judgements can take:
Lemma 3.2. Suppose ;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′.
µ = τ : Here ′ =  and ′ = .
µ = a?v: Here′ =  while′ =   v : A for some type A such that  v : B, a : wδ〈B〉,
for some δ 
 σ and B <: A.
µ = (c˜)a!v: Here ′ = , c˜ : C˜ for some sequence of types C˜ such that , c˜ : C˜  v : A,
while ′ =   v : A for some A such that rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a), where δ 
 σ.
Proof. Straightforward rule induction on ;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′. 
However we are only interested in a subset of the possible judgements which can be
derived from the rules in Fig. 5. We say that the two type environments  and  are
compatible if
•   exists,
• domain() ⊆ domain().
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The main property of this relation is given by:
Lemma 3.3. Suppose  and  are compatible. Then   a : wρ〈A〉 and   a : rρ′ 〈A′〉
imply A <: A′ and ρ 
 ρ′.
Proof. Simple calculation. 
The triple ;  P is said to be a configuration if
•  and  are compatible,
•   P .
When this is the case we will refer to the judgment ;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′ as an
action in context.
Configurations are preserved by these actions:
Lemma 3.4. If ;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′ is an action in context then ′;′  P ′ is a
configuration.
Proof. From Lemma 3.2 we know exactly the form ′ and ′ can take, depending on µ.
In each case it is straightforward to show that they are compatible. The simplest way to
show that ′  P ′ is using rule induction on ;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′. 
In future we will limit our attention to judgements ;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′, which
are actions in context. This has important consequences, in the case when µ is an output
action (c˜ : C˜)a!v. It means that the only new names gained by the observer, that is names
in the domain of ′ which are not in that of , are c˜. In other words if w is an identifier
in v which does not occur in c˜ the observer already knows about it. However the action
may increase the type at which the observer knows w. It is also worth noting that the two
rules (C-IN) and (C-OUT) are a priori partial; that is (C-IN) can only be applied if   v : A
is well-defined while (C-OUT) requires   v : A to be well-defined. However it is easy to
show that for actions in context these environments are in fact well-defined whenever the
corresponding premises hold. Moreover in (C-IN) the side-condition B <: A may be omitted
as it is always satisfied.
We can also determine the circumstances under which the unconstrained actions, from
Fig. 5, can give rise to actions in context.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose P µ−→ Q and let ;  P be a configuration.
µ = τ : Here ;  P τ−→σ ; Q.
µ = a?v: Here if   v : B, a : wδ〈B〉, where δ 
 σ then ;  P a?v−→σ ;  v : A 
Q for some A such that B <: A.
µ = (c˜ : C˜)a!v: Here if rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a) for some δ 
 σ then ;  P (c˜)a!v−−−→σ   v : A;,
c˜ : C˜ Q.
Proof. By rule induction on P µ−→ Q. We examine the case when µ is (c˜ : C˜)a!v, where
the induction requires a weakening of the hypothesis, namely that   P and   exists.
• Suppose P µ−→ Q is inferred using (L-OUT). We can immediately apply (C-OUT) to
obtain the required ;  P a!v−→σ   v : A; Q, provided   v : A exists.
However P has the form a!〈v〉 and from   P we know that   v : B, a : wρ〈B〉
for some B. Applying Lemma 3.3 we obtain B <: A. Then it is easy to show the
existence of   v : A from the fact that  and  are compatible.
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• Suppose P µ−→ Q is inferred using (L-OPEN), that is
(new b : B) P ′ (b : B)(c˜ : C˜)a!v−−−−−−−−→ Q
because P ′ (c˜ : C˜)a!v−−−−−→ Q.
  P implies , b : B  P ′ and the existence of   also ensures that of  
, b : B. In short the (weaker) inductive hypothesis holds of ;, b : B  P ′ and there-
fore by induction we can obtain the action in context ;, b : B  P ′ (c˜)a!v−−−→σ Q. An
application of (C-OPEN) gives the required ;  P (b)(c˜)a!v−−−−−→σ Q. 
Note that in actions in context ;  P µ−→σ ′;′ Q the resulting environments,
′;′, are not in general determined by  and . The change in the environment of the
observed process, the change from  to ′, is determined by the declared types of new
names introduced by the process. For example consider
P1 = (new c : C1) a!〈c〉 0, P2 = (new c : C2) a!〈c〉 0
where Ci are two different types. Then, assuming , have appropriate capabilities asso-
ciated with a, we have
;  P1 (c)a!c−−−→σ ′;, c : C1  0
;  P2 (c)a!c−−−→σ ′;, c : C2  0
The reason for this lack of determinism is that the types of bound names are not recorded in
the actions in context. However were we to record their types we would then have processes
which are obviously behaviourally indistinguishable, P1 and P2 for example, which would
have different actions in context.
The lack of determinism of the observers type environment, the change from  to ′,
will however play a role in the next section. This arises because of the rule (C-OUT) in Fig. 5.
In general (a) may contain two read capabilities, rδ1〈A1〉 and rδ2〈A2〉, in which case ′
may take either of the forms   v : A1 or   v : A2. However by restricting ourselves to
single-level types this problem does not arise.
We say  is a single-level environment if it only uses single-level types. For such
environments we can define the partial predicate  afterσ s by induction on s as follows:
s = ε: Here  afterσ s = ,
s = a?v · s′: Here  afterσ s =  afterσ s′,
s = (c˜)a!v · s′: Here  afterσ s is only defined if rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a) for some δ 
 σ , in which
case it is (  v : A) afterσ s′.
Lemma 3.6. If ;  P s−→σ ′;′ Q, where  is a single-level environment, then
 afterσ s is defined and ′ =  afterσ s.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ;  P s−→σ ′;′ Q. 
3.3. May testing
In this section we give a characterisation of the relation  σ P ∼may Q.
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Actions in context are generalised to (asynchronous) traces in context as follows:
Definition 3.7 (Traces). Let ;  P s=⇒σ ′;′  P ′ be the least relation such that:
(TR-τ)
;  P τ−→σ ′;′  P ′
′;′  P ′ s=⇒σ ′′;′′  P ′′
;  P s=⇒σ ′′;′′  P ′′
(TR-5)
;  P 5=⇒σ ;  P
(TR-α)
;  P α−→σ ′;′  P ′
′;′  P ′ s=⇒σ ′′;′′  P ′′
;  P α·s=⇒σ ′′;′′  P ′′
(TR-ASYNC)
  v : A
;  v : A  a : wδ〈A〉  P | a!〈v〉 s=⇒σ ′′;′′  P ′′
;  P a?v·s==⇒σ ′′;′′  P ′′ δ 
 σ
Note that, for simplicity, we have allowed some redundancy here. The rule (TR-α), where
α is an input action a?v, can actually be derived from (TR-ASYNC) and (TR-τ).
We now show how interactions between a process P and a σ -level observer T , that is
a computation from T | P , can be decomposed into a trace in context from P and the
complementary sequence from T . It will become clear that it is sufficient to only consider
newf ree observers, that is observers which contain no occurrence of the binders (new a).
Theorem 3.8 (Trace decomposition). Let ;  P be a configuration and suppose T |
P τ−→∗ R for some newf ree observer T such that  σ T . Then there exists a trace in
context
;  P s=⇒σ ′;′  P ′
and a derivation T s=⇒ T ′, where R has the form (new c˜ : C˜) (T ′ | P ′).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of T | P τ−→∗ R. Consider the non-trivial case when
this is of the form T | P τ−→ τ−→∗ R. There are essentially three cases:
• Output from T to P . In this case we have T a!v−→ T1, P a?v−→ P1 and T1 | P1 τ−→∗ R.
 σ T means   v : B, a : wδ〈B〉, for some δ 
 σ and B, and so we may apply
Lemma 3.5 to obtain the action in context
;  P a?v−→σ ;  v : A  P1
for some B <: A. Moreover the compatibility of  and   v : A follows from that of 
and .
Subject Reduction implies that  σ T1 and therefore we may apply induction to
obtain
;  P1 s′=⇒σ ′;′  P ′ and T1 s′=⇒ T ′
where R has the form (new c˜ : C˜) (T ′ | P ′). The required s is a?v · s′.
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• Output from P to T . In this case we have T a?v−→ T1, P (c˜ : C˜)a!v−−−−−→ P1, and T1 | P1 τ−→∗
R1, where R has the form (new c˜ : C˜) R1.
Here  σ T implies   rδ〈A〉 for some δ 
 σ and so we can apply Lemma 3.5 to
obtain the action in context
;  P (c˜)a!v−−−→σ   v : A;, c˜ : C˜  P1
Also by Subject Reduction we know   v : A σ T1. So we may apply induction to
obtain a trace in context
  v : A;, c˜ : C˜  P1 s′=⇒σ ′;′  P ′
and the reduction T1 s
′=⇒ T ′. The required s in this case is (c˜)a!v · s′.
• Internal actions by P or T . In this case a simple argument by induction suffices. 
The converse is more straightforward:
Theorem 3.9 (Trace composition). Suppose ;  P s=⇒σ ′;′  P ′ and T s=⇒ T ′ for
some s. Then there exists a derivation T | P τ−→∗ R,whereR has the form (new c˜ : C˜) (T ′ |
P ′).
Proof. By induction on s. 
Referring to the statement of this theorem note that Subject Reduction ensures that
′  P ′. However in general we do not have that ′ σ T ′, even under the assumption
 σ T .
Example 3.10. Let P, T be the processes (new c : C) a!〈c〉 and a?(x : A2) x!〈〉 respect-
ively and let , map a to the type {rδ1〈A1〉, rδ2〈A2〉, wbot〈C〉}, where A1, A2, C are the
types rbot〈〉, wbot〈〉, {A1,A2} respectively; here we assume δi 
 σ . Then
 σ T
  P
;  P (c)a!c−−−→σ , c : A1;′  0
T a?c−→ c!〈〉
but , c : A1 σ c!〈〉.
The problem lies, again, with the use of multi-level types, as in the example a may be
read at the two levels, δ1, δ2.
Lemma 3.11. Let  be a single-level environment. Suppose  σ T and  afterσ s is
defined. Then T s=⇒ T ′ implies  afterσ s σ T ′.
Proof. By induction on s. 
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This lemma may now be applied to the conditions of the trace composition theorem,
Theorem 3.9, to ensure when  is a single-level environment we can also conclude that
′ σ T ′; here ′ can only be  afterσ s.
We may now state a sufficient condition to ensure two processes are related with respect
to may testing.
Definition 3.12. For any configuration C let Aseqσ (C) = { s | C s=⇒σ}.
Proposition 3.13. Suppose  P,Q,where and are compatible. Then Aseqσ (; 
P) ⊆ Aseqσ (; Q) implies  σ P ∼may Q.
Proof. First notice that to show  σ P ∼may Q it is sufficient to consider newf ree
observers T such that  σ T . For given any other test T ′ there exists newf ree T such that
T ′ ≡ (new c˜ : C˜) T and T ′ | P can eventually report a success if and only if T | P can.
So suppose P may T , where T is a newf ree test such that  σ T . Then there ex-
ists a computation T | P τ−→∗ R, where R can report a success. Because ;  P is a
configuration Theorem 3.8 can be used to obtain the decomposition into a trace in context
;  P s=⇒σ ′;′  P ′
and a sequence T s=⇒ T ′, where R has the form (new c˜ : C˜) (T ′ | P ′).
Since Aseqσ (;  P) ⊆ Aseqσ (; Q) there exists a corresponding trace in con-
text from Q,
; Q s=⇒σ ′;′ Q′
Trace composition, Theorem 3.9, can now be used to recombine this with T s=⇒ T ′ to
obtain a successful computation from T |Q. 
To prove the converse we need to design tests which can detect the ability of processes
to perform traces in context. Specifically we will construct a test T (, s, σ ), a newf ree
process such that  σ T (, s, σ ), with the property that P may T (, s, σ ) if and only if
there is some  such that ;  P s=⇒. Note  will not be used in the definition and the
tests will only be defined for certain combinations of  and s.
For convenience we only consider traces in which only simple identifiers are output,
rather than vectors; that is the output actions are of the form a!v or (c)a!c. The generalisa-
tion to general output actions of the form (c˜ : C˜)a!v is very straightforward, but notationally
complex. The definition of T (, s, σ ) is by induction on s.
ε: T (, ε, σ ) is ω!〈〉.
a?v · s: In this case the test is defined only if
• there exists some δ 
 σ such that   a : wδ〈A〉 for some type A such that  
v : A,
• T (, s, σ ) is defined.
If this is the case then T (, a?v · s, σ ) is defined to be
a!〈v〉 | T (, s, σ )
a!v · s: Here the test is defined if
• v ∈ domain(),
• there exists some type A such that rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a) for some δ 
 σ,
• T (  v : A, s, σ ) is defined.
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For each such A let TA(, a!v · s, σ ) be the test
a?(x : A) if x = v then T (  v : A, s, σ ) else 0
Then the required test is
TA1(, a!v · s, σ )⊕ · · · ⊕ TAk (, a!v · s, σ )
where A1 . . .Ak is the set of all types which satisfy the conditions above and ⊕ repres-
ents an internal choice operator. This is easily definable by
T ⊕ U = (new c : C) (c!〈〉 | c?() T | c?() U)
where C is the type {wσ 〈〉, rσ 〈〉}.
(c)a!c · s: Here the test is defined if
• there exists some type A such that rδ〈A〉 ∈  for some δ 
 σ,
• T (, c : A, s, σ ) is defined.
Here again T (, (c)a!c · s, σ ) has the form
TA1(, (c)a!c · s, σ )⊕ · · · TAk (, (c)a!c · s, σ )
where Ai range over all the types satisfying these conditions. For such an A, TA(,
(c)a!c · s, σ ) given by
a?(x : A) if x ∈ I (,A) then 0 else (T (, c : A, s, σ )){|x/c|}
where I (,A) is the finite set of identifiers { u |   u : A } and if x ∈ I then P else Q
represents the obvious nested if then else structure.
The required properties of these tests are collected in the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.14. If T (, s, σ ) is defined then
•  σ T (, s, σ ),
• T (, s, σ ) s=⇒ R, where R w!〈〉−−→.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on s, although there are considerable details to be
checked. For example when s has the form a!v · s′ then for  σ T (, s, σ ) to be true it is
essential that v to be in the domain of . 
Lemma 3.15. If there exists some P and some  such that ;  P s=⇒ then T (, s, σ )
is defined.
Proof. By induction on the judgement ;  P s=⇒. As an example we consider one
case, when it has the form
;  P a!v−→   v : A;  P ′ s′=⇒
where rδ〈A〉 ∈  for some A and δ 
 σ .
By induction we know T (  v : A, s′, σ ) is defined. From Subject Reduction we know
  v : A and since  and  are compatible we have that v is in the domain of . So for
at least one A the test TA(, a!v · s′, σ ) is defined. It follows that T (, a!v · s′, σ ) is also
defined. 
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It therefore follows from the composition theorem that ;  P s=⇒ implies P may
T (, s, σ ). We also have the converse:
Lemma 3.16. Suppose T (, s, σ ) exists and ;  P is a configuration. Then P may
T (, s, σ ) implies ;  P s=⇒.
Proof. By induction on s, and by way of example we consider the case when it has the
form a!v · s′.
By examining the form of T (, s, σ ) it must be that P τ−→∗ a!v−→ P ′ for some P ′ such
that P ′ may T (  v : A, s′, σ ) for some A such that rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a), where δ 
 σ .
Subject Reduction means   P ′ and therefore it is easy to check that   v : A;  P ′
is a configuration. So we may apply induction to obtain
  v : A;  P ′ s′=⇒
Lemma 3.5 gives
;  P τ−→∗ a!v−→   v : A;  P ′
and the result now follows by (TR-α) in Definition 3.7. 
It therefore follows that
Theorem 3.17 (Alternative characterisation of may testing). Suppose   P,Q, and  is
compatible with. Then σ P ∼may Q if and only if Aseqσ (;  P) ⊆ Aseqσ (; 
Q).
Proof. The sequence of lemmas establishes that whenever ;  P is a configuration,
;  P s=⇒ if and only if (T (, s, σ ) exists and P may T (, s, σ ))
This is all that is required to prove the converse of Proposition 3.13. 
3.4. Must testing
In this section examine the relation  σ P ∼must Q; in particular we give necessary
and sufficient criteria for ensuring  σ P ∼must Q, based on traces in context.
The extra ingredients required to capture must testing, in addition to traces, are well-
known from [10,17]; they include a convergence predicate, indicating that a process has
no internal infinite computations, and acceptance sets, indicating the next possible ac-
tions in which a process can engage. Here these need to be generalised from processes to
configurations; they must also be relativised to security levels.
Definition 3.18 (Convergence). We say the configurationC converges, writtenC ⇓, if there
is no infinite sequence of derivations
C τ−→ C1 τ−→ · · · τ−→ Ck τ−→
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This relation is then parameterised to sequences in context and security levels by
ε: C ⇓σ if C ⇓,
s = (c˜)a!v · s′: C ⇓σ s if C ⇓ and whenever C (c˜)a!v===⇒σ C′, C′ ⇓σ s′,
s = a?v · s′: C ⇓σ s if
•   a : wδ〈A〉, v : A for some δ 
 σ,
• ;  v : A  a : wδ〈A〉  a!〈A〉 | P ⇓σ s′.
Note that the requirements in the input case are taken directly from the rule (TR-ASYNC).
Note also that for a configuration ;  P whether or not it converges is actually inde-
pendent of the typing environments  and ; it is only dependent on the semantics of P
as given in Fig. 2. However convergence relative to a sequence in context is in general
dependent on these environments.
We now adapt the definition of Acceptance sets [10] to the security π-calculus. First let
Oσ (C) = { a! | ∃v.C a!v−→σ }
and
Rσ (C) = { a? | ∃v.C a?v−→σ } ∪Oσ (C)
Definition 3.19 (Acceptance sets). For a configuration C, let Aσ (C, s), its σ -level accept-
ance set after s, be defined by
{Rσ (C′) | C s=⇒σ C′  τ−→ }
Similarly let its output acceptance set after s be given by
{Oσ (C′) | C s=⇒σ C′  τ−→ }
Note only acceptance sets from stable configurations, configurations C′ such that C′  τ−→,
are used.
The security π-calculus is asynchronous and therefore, as explained in [4], acceptance
sets are too discriminating, when used to characterise must testing; to see this it is sufficient
to consider the simple example
a?(x)0 ∼must 0
The same reference goes on to explain that the use of output acceptance sets must also be
relativised to sets of input actions, which we now explain.
Input completions. We use Iσ (C) to denote the set of input actions which the configur-
ation C can perform at level σ , { a?v | C a?v−→σ }. More generally we use I to denote an
arbitrary multi-set of input actions, c(I ) to denote { a? | a?v ∈ I } and c(I ) its converse,
{ a! | a?v ∈ I }.
Then ↘σI is defined to be the least relation which satisfies• C  τ−→ and Iσ (C) ∩ I = ∅ implies C↘σI C,• C i=⇒σ C′ and C′ ↘σI C′′ implies C↘σIunionmulti{i} C′′.
Intuitively C′ ↘σI C′ means that C can evolve to a stable configuration C′ by performing a
subset of the input actions in the multi-set I ; moreover this subset is maximal in the sense
that C′ can not perform any of the remaining actions.
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Definition 3.20 (Asynchronous acceptance sets). For a configuration C, let OσI (C, s), its
σ -level asynchronous acceptance set after s, relative to the multi-set of input actions I , be
defined by
{Oσ (C′′) | C s=⇒σ , C′ ↘σI C′′ }
With one final notational convention we can mimic the alternative characterisation of
must testing from [4]. We write  allowsσ a?v if  σ a!〈v〉; this is generalised to sets of
actions in the normal manner.
Definition 3.21. Let C,D be configurations of the form ;  P , ;′ Q respect-
ively. Then C 'σ D if for every s,
C ⇓ s implies a) D ⇓ s
b) ∀D ∈ Aσ (D, s), ∀I such that c(I ) ∩D = ∅ and
( afterσ s) allowsσ I,
∃O ∈ OσI (C, s) such that O − c(I ) ⊆ D
Theorem 3.22. Let , be single-level environments and suppose   P,Q, where  is
compatible with . Then  σ P ∼must Q if and only if ;  P 'σ ; Q.
The remainder of this subsection is devoted to the proof of this theorem. We will assume
all triples ;  P are configurations, and that all environments are single-level.
Proposition 3.23. ;  P 'σ ; Q implies  σ P ∼must Q.
Proof (Outline). The proof follows the outline of that of Lemma 4.4.13 of [10], although
the details are more complicated because of asynchrony and the use of type environments
and security levels.
Let T be an arbitrary newf ree test such that  σ P and suppose P must T . We show
Q must T . Let
T |Q (≡ T0 |Q0) τ−→ C1 τ−→ · · · · · ·Ck τ−→ · · · (†)
be an arbitrary maximal computation from T |Q, where we may assume each Ck has the
form (new c˜k : C˜k) Tk |Qk . We must show that for some k, Tk ω!〈〉−→.
First suppose that the computation (†) is finite, ending in Cn. Using Trace Decomposi-
tion it can decomposed into
; Q s=⇒; Qn
T s=⇒Tn
From Lemma 2.5 we can assume Tn has the form a1!〈v1〉 | · · · ak!〈vk〉 | T ′, where T ′ cannot
perform any input moves. Let I denote the multi-set of input actions, {a1?v1, . . . , ak?vk}.
We will use I ′ | T ′, where I ′ is a subset of I , to denote the obvious term consisting of T ′
in parallel with the multi-set of output atoms determined by I ′. Finally let D denote the
acceptance set determined by the configuration Cn. Note that c(I ) ∩D = ∅.
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At this stage let us suppose that ;  P ⇓σ s. Then we can apply the hypothesis
to obtain an O ∈ OσI (;  P, s) such that O − c(I ) ⊆ D. This means that there is a
trace
;  P s=⇒σ 1;1  P1 I ′=⇒σ m;m  Pm
where
m;m  Pm  τ−→
m;m  Pm  a?v−→σ for any a?v ∈ I − I ′
By trace composition we can form
T | P τ−→∗ Tn | P1 τ−→∗ (I2 | T ′) | Pm, I2 = I − I ′
If we can show that this is maximal, that is (I2 | T ′) | Pm  τ−→, then we are finished because
P must T means that for some k, Tk ω!〈〉−→.
The only possibility is a communication between Pm and I2 | T ′. In both cases below we
rely on the fact that the environments are single-level, enabling us to employ Lemmas 3.6
and 3.11.
Input: For some a?v ∈ I2, Pm a?v−→.
Here from Lemma 3.6 we know that 1 and m are  afterσ s. Applying Lemma 3.11
it follows that m σ a!〈v〉, which by Lemma 3.5 is sufficient to ensure that m;m 
Pm
a?v−→σ . This contradicts (1) above.
Output: Here we have Pm (c)a!〈v〉−−−−→ and T ′ a?v−→.
Again from Lemma 3.11 we know m σ T ′ and therefore a! ∈ O ⊆ D; so Qn (c˜)a!w−−−→
for some valuew. Because of the structure of our language, T ′ a?v−→ implies that T ′ a?w−−→
is also true, and therefore we have a contradiction of the maximality of Cn.
This completes the proof, under the assumptions that ;  P ⇓σ s and the computa-
tion under scrutiny (†) is finite. However these assumptions can be taken care of in the
standard manner, as in the proof of Lemma 4.4.13 of [10]. 
As in the case of may testing the proof of the converse depends on the ability to define
well-typed tests which determine the relation 'σ . Here there are two possible reasons
why configurations may not be related; one associated with convergence, the other with a
mismatch of acceptance sets. We treat each in turn. As in the previous subsection to avoid
notational complexity we only consider simple output actions, where only single names
are transmitted. We also use some of the derived notation developed in that subsection.
Tests for convergence. We define the terms TC(, s, σ ) by induction on s:
ε: Here TC(, s, σ ) = ω!〈〉 ⊕ ω!〈〉
a!v · s′: Here TC(, s, σ ) is given by
(new n) n!〈〉 | n?() ω!〈〉 | a?(x : A) if x = v
then n?() TC(  v : A, s′, σ )
else 0
where rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a) for some δ 
 σ.
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(c)a!c · s′: In this case TC(, s, σ ) is given by
(new n) n!〈〉 | n?() ω!〈〉 | a?(x : A) if x ∈ I (,A)
then 0
else (n?() TC(, c : A, s′, σ )){|x/c|}
where again rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a) for some δ 
 σ.
a?v · s′: Here TC(, s, σ ) is only defined if   a : wδ〈A〉, v : A for some δ 
 σ , in which
case it is
a!〈v〉 | TC(, s′, σ )
We leave the reader to check the following:
Lemma 3.24. If ; Q s=⇒σ ′;′ Q′, where Q′ ⇓ then
• TC(, s, σ ) is defined,
•  σ TC(, s, σ ),
• Q mu st TC(, s, σ ).
Proof. By induction on s. 
Corollary 3.25.  σ P ∼must Q and ;  P ⇓σ s implies ; Q ⇓σ s.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that for some s, ;  P ⇓σ s, while ; Q s=⇒σ
′;′ Q, for some Q′ such that Q′ ⇓. By the previous lemma it is sufficient to show
P must TC(, s, σ ), which can easily be done by induction on s. 
Tests for acceptance sets. Let us first extend the predicate allowsσ to apply to output
acceptance sets, in addition to sets of input actions. We write  allowsσ O if, for each
a! ∈ O, rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a) for some δ 
 σ , and   v : A for some value v; note that this means
 σ a!〈v〉.
We now define terms T (, s,O, I, σ ), where O is an output acceptance set and I
is a set of input actions, by induction on s. The inductive cases are very similar to the
corresponding cases in the definition of the tests for convergence.
ε: Here T (, s,O, I, σ ) is only defined if  allowsσ O, I , in which case it is∏
{ a!〈v〉 | a?v ∈ I } |
∏
{ a?(x :Aa)ω!〈〉 | a! ∈ O }
Here the type Aa is determined by the fact that  allowsσ O.
a!v · s′: Here the test is given by
(new n) n!〈〉 | n?() ω!〈〉 | a?(x : A) if x = v
then n?() T (  v : A, s′,O, I, σ )
else 0
where A is determined by rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a) for some δ 
 σ .
(c)a!c · s′: Here it is defined by
(new n) n!〈〉 | n?() ω!〈〉 | a?(x : A) if x ∈ I (,A)
then 0
else (n?() T (, c : A, s′,O, I, σ )){|x/c|}
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where, again, rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a) for some δ 
 σ .
a?v · s′: Here, as in the tests for convergence, the test is only defined if   a : wδ〈A〉, v : A
for some δ 
 σ , in which case it is
a!〈v〉 | TC(, s′,O, I, σ )
We leave the reader to establish the following two lemmas:
Lemma 3.26. Suppose ( afterσ s) allowsσ O, I and that ; Q s=⇒σ , for some .
Then T (, s,O, I, σ ) is well-defined and  σ T (, s,O, I, σ ).
Lemma 3.27. Suppose T (, s,O, I, σ ) is defined and O ′ ∩O = ∅ for every O ′ ∈
OσI (;  P, s). Then ;  P ⇓σ s implies P must T (, s,O, I, σ ).
We are now ready to prove the alternative characterisation:
Theorem 3.28 (Theorem 3.22).  σ P ∼must Q if and only if ;  P 'σ ; Q.
Proof. Because of the previous sequence of results it is sufficient to prove ;  P 'σ
; Q implies that there exists a test T such that  σ T , P must T , while Q mu st
T . In view of Corollary 3.25 there must be some s such that ;  P ⇓σ s and some
computation
; Q s=⇒σ C, A = Rσ (C) (∗)
and some I such that ( afterσ s) allowsσ I and c(I ) ∩ A = ∅ with the property that for
every O ′ ∈ OσI (;  P, s),O ′ ⊆ A ∪ c(I ). Let OσI (;  P, s) = {O1, . . . , On} and
for each i choose ai ! such that ai ! ∈ Oi − (A ∪ c(I )). Let O be the set {a1!, . . . , an!}.
We now have all the ingredients to apply the previous two lemmas to obtain the test
T (, s,O, I, σ ), well-typed with respect to at level σ such that P must T (, s,O, I, σ ).
However the computation (∗) above shows that Q mu st T (, s,O, I, σ ), since c(O) ∩
c(I ) = ∅. 
4. Non-interference results
In this section we reconsider the approach taken to non-interference in Section 4 of [12].
The essential idea is that if a process is well-typed at a given level σ then its behaviour at
that level is independent of processes “running at higher security levels”; or more generally
“running at security levels independent to σ”. A particular formulation of such a result was
given in Theorem 5.3 of [12]:
Theorem 4.1. If  σ P ,Q and  ( H,K, where H,K are σ -free processes, then  σ
P may Q implies  σ P |H may Q |K.
Here, because of our more refined notions of well-typing, we can give offer a significant
improvement on this theorem, and moreover the formulation is actually easier.
Let us say that the security level δ is independent of σ if δ 
 σ . We can ensure that a
process H is “running at a security level independent to σ” by demanding that  δ H , for
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some δ independent of σ . In fact we will only require the weaker typing relation  wδ H .
This ensures that all the output actions of H are at a level independent of σ , as can be
deduced from the following property:
Lemma 4.2. Suppose wδ H. Then ; H µ−→ρ,whereµ is an output action, implies
δ 
 ρ.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ; H µ−→ρ . The only non-trivial case is the
base case ;  a!〈v〉 a!v−→ρ 0.
Here we have  a : wδ′ 〈A〉 for some δ 
 δ′. Because of (C-OUT) we know  a : rρ′ 〈B〉
for some ρ′ 
 ρ. We can now apply Lemma 3.3 to obtain δ′ 
 ρ′ from which it follows
that δ 
 ρ. 
We can now state our first non-interference result. Note that it applies to processes such
that  rσ P , Q rather than  σ P , Q; only their input actions need to be at level at most
σ .
Theorem 4.3 (Non-interference 1). Let  and  be compatible and suppose  rσ P , Q.
Then
 σ P ∼may Q implies  σ P |H ∼may Q |K
provided  wδ H, K for some δ independent of σ.
Proof. Because of Proposition 3.13 it is sufficient to prove
;  P |H s=⇒σ implies ;  P s=⇒σ
This is proved by induction on the derivation of ;  P |H s=⇒σ . The base case, when
s is ε, is trivial, and there are three possibilities for the inductive case.
First suppose the derivation has the form
;  P |H α−→σ ′;′  R s′=⇒σ
Here there are two cases.
α is performed by P : So R has the form P ′ |H and
;  P α−→σ ′;′  P ′
By Subject Reduction, Theorem 2.6, we know ′ rσ P ′ and therefore we can apply
induction to obtain the result.
α is performed by H : Here R has the form P |H ′ and
; H α−→σ ′;′ H ′
From the previous lemma we know α must be an input, say a?v, and from Lemma 3.2
we know that ′ is simply  and ′ must take the form   v : A for some type A. By
weakening we therefore have ′ rσ P and we may apply induction to obtain ′;′ 
P s
′=⇒σ .
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From the same lemma we know that   a : wδ〈B〉, v : B for some δ 
 σ and B <:
A. So we can infer
;′  v : B  a : wδ〈B〉  P | a!〈v〉 s′=⇒σ
An application of (TR-ASYNC) now gives the required ;  P α·s′==⇒σ .
The second possibility is that the derivation is derived using an instance of (TR-ASYNC).
Here a simple inductive argument suffices.
The final possibility is that it has the form
;  P |H τ−→σ ′;′  R s=⇒σ
If the initial τ action is performed either by P , or by H then (by Subject Reduction) we
can apply induction to obtain the result. So there remains two cases:
Output from H to P : It turns out that this is not possible, because δ 
 σ .
Suppose we did have such an output. Then we would have
 wδ H, H (c˜)a!v−−−→ H ′
 rσ P , P a?v−→ P ′
Applying Subject Reduction we would have
  a : wδ′ 〈A〉, δ 
 δ′
  a : rσ ′ 〈B〉, σ ′ 
 σ
The consistency requirement on types implies δ′ 
 σ ′, which contradicts δ 
 σ .
Output from P to H : Here the derivation takes the form
;  P |H τ−→σ ;  (c˜ : C˜)(P ′ |H ′) s=⇒σ
where P (c˜)a!v−−−→ P ′ and H a?v−→ H ′. So there exists a sequence sC , associated with s,
such that
;; c˜ : C˜  P ′ |H ′ sC=⇒σ (∗)
with the property that for any R such that ;; c˜ : C˜  R sC=⇒σ it follows that ; 
(c˜ : C˜)R s=⇒σ .
Applying induction to (∗) we obtain
;; c˜ : C˜  P ′ sC=⇒σ
Note that this is possible since Subject Reduction gives
, c˜ : C˜ rσ P ′,   v : A wδ H ′
where A is a type such that , c˜ : C˜ <:   v : A. (In fact A is the type at which v is
sent by P .)
It follows that ;, c˜ : C˜  P ′ | a!〈v〉 sC=⇒σ and therefore
;  (new c˜ : C˜) (P ′ | a!〈v〉) s=⇒σ
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But by Lemma 2.5 we know
P ≡ (new c˜ : C˜) (P ′ | a!〈v〉)
and the result follows. 
We end the paper with a non-interference result with respect to must testing. Note that
Theorem 4.3 is no longer true when ∼may is replaced by ∼must , as the following example
shows.
Example 4.4. Let A denote the type {wbot〈〉, rbot〈〉, rtop〈〉} and B denote {rtop〈〉}. Further,
let  map a to A and n to the type {wbot〈A〉, rbot〈A〉, rtop〈B〉}. Now consider the processes
P and H defined by
P ⇐ n!〈a〉 | n?(x : A) x!〈〉 H ⇐ n?(x : B)0
It is very easy to check that  rbot P and  wtop H . However
; bot P | 0 ∼must P |H
because of the bot level test a?() ω!〈〉.
The presence or absence of H determines whether or not there is read contention on
the channel n, which in turn influences the deadlock capabilities of P with respect to the
channel a.
Here the problem is the type of the channel n; it may be read at both level bot and top.
Note that such examples, where there is contention between reads at different levels, can
not be expressed in the join calculus [5].
A not unreasonable restriction would be to require that the read capability of channels be
confined to a particular security level. This would not rule out inter-level communication,
but simply control it more tightly. This restriction can be enforced by requiring the type-
checking to use single-level types and forbidding high-level processes to read from low-
level channels.
Theorem 4.5 (Non-interference 2). Let  and  be compatible single-level environments
and suppose  rσ P , Q. Then
 σ P ∼must Q implies  σ P |H ∼must Q |K
for all finite processes H, K such that  δ H, K for some δ independent of σ.
Note that we must restrict our attention to finite H and K since must testing is sensitive
to divergence; if H is a divergent term then we could not expect  σ P | 0 must P |H
to hold when P is a convergent term. This problem is avoided by restricting attention to
finite terms, which can never diverge. Restricting H and K to use channels at level at
least δ, together with the use of single-level types, ensures that there is no contention, as
exhibited in Example 4.4, between high- and low-level processes over read access to a
channel.
The remainder of the section is devoted to the proof of this final result of the paper.
Throughout we will assume  and  are compatible single-level environments,  rσ P ,
 δ H for some δ independent of σ , and moreover that H is a finite process.
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Lemma 4.6. For every s, ;  P ⇓σ s if and only if ;  P |H ⇓σ s.
Proof. One direction is easy, ;  P ⇓σ s implies ;  P |H ⇓σ s.
Conversely, because H is finite, we can assume that
;  P |H s=⇒σ (c˜ : C˜)(P ′ |H ′)
for some P ′ such that P ′ ⇓. We leave the reader to prove, by induction on this derivation,
that ;  P s=⇒σ (c˜′ : C˜′)P ′ for some c˜′, C˜′. 
Proposition 4.7. Suppose A ∈ Aσ (;  P, s) and I is a multi-set of inputs such that
c(I ) ∩ A = ∅ and ( afterσ s) allowsσ I. Suppose further that ;  P ⇓σ s. Then there
exists some O ∈ OσI (;  P |H, s) such that O − c(I ) ⊆ A.
Proof. By induction on the derivation
;  P s=⇒σ D, where A = Rσ (D)
• The empty derivation.
Here A = Rσ (;  P). This means that P  τ−→ but we may have P |H τ−→ either
because H τ−→ or there maybe a write-up from P to H . But because H is syntactically
finite and P ⇓ we know there is some P ′ |H ′ such that P |H τ−→∗ P ′ |H ′  τ−→.
By Lemma 2.5 we know thatRσ (;  P ′ |H ′) ⊆ A and therefore, since c(I ) ∩ A =
∅, ;  P ′ |H ′ ↘σI ;  P ′ |H ′. The required O may therefore be taken to be the
output subset of A.
• The derivation has the form ;  P (c)a!v−−−→σ ′;′  P ′ s=⇒σ D .
By Subject Reduction we know ′ rσ P ′ and therefore we may apply induction to
obtain O ∈ OσI (;  P ′ |H, s) with the required properties. The result now follows
since OσI (;  P ′ |H, s) ⊆ OσI (;  P |H, (c)a!v · s).• The remaining cases are similar. 
We also have the converse.
Proposition 4.8. Suppose A ∈ Aσ (;  P |H, s) and, as in the previous proposition,
I is a set of inputs such that c(I ) ∩ A = ∅ and ( afterσ s) allowsσ I. Then there exists
some O ∈ OσI (;  P, s) such that O − c(I ) ⊆ A.
Proof. Again by induction on the derivation
;  P |H s=⇒σ D, where A = Rσ (D)
As an example we examine the case
;  P |H τ−→ D ′ s=⇒σ D
where the initial τ consists of a communication between P and H . This must be a write-up
from P to H ; so D ′ has the form ;  (c˜ : C˜)P ′ |H ′, where P (c˜ : C˜)a!v−−−−−→ P ′ and H a?v−→
H ′. We know P has the form (c˜ : C˜)(a!〈v〉 | P ′), but more importantly that rδ〈A〉 ∈ (a)
for some δ independent from σ(†). What this means is there can be no communication
between a!〈v〉 and any Q such that  rσ Q.
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Now the derivation ;  (c˜ : C˜)P ′ |H ′ s=⇒σ D can be transformed into ;, c˜ : C˜ 
P ′ |H ′ sC=⇒σ E , where Rσ (D) = Rσ (D). Moreover we can apply induction to this de-
rivation, to obtain O ∈ OσI (;, c˜ : C˜  P ′, sC) such that O − c(I ) ⊆ A.
We can use (†) to prove O is also in OσI (;, c˜ : C˜  a!〈a〉 | P ′, sC). The result now
follows since
OσI (;, c˜ : C˜  a!〈a〉 | P ′, sC) ⊆ OσI (;, c˜ : C˜  c˜ : C˜a!〈a〉 | P ′, s) 
Corollary 4.9 (Theorem 4.5). suppose  rσ P , Q. Then
 σ P ∼must Q implies  σ P |H ∼must Q |K
for all finite processes H, K such that  δ H, K for some δ independent of σ.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove
;  P 'σ ;  P |H and ;  P |H 'σ ;  P
These follow from the two previous propositions and Lemma 4.6. 
5. Conclusions and related work
This paper is a direct continuation of the research reported in [12]. There we focused on
the general topic of security types, showing that resource access control could be enforced
using a typing system and information flow control could be obtained by a restriction to the
set of types employed. The import of Subject Reduction was emphasised by developing a
Type Safety Theorem, which in turn required a version of the language in which processes
were tagged with their security levels. Here we concentrated on types for information flow,
calling the resulting language the security π-calculus. The first main result consists of
alternative characterisations of may and must testing for this language. These use a novel
labelled transition system, with judgements of the form
;  P µ−→σ ′;′  P ′
which records the security levels at which actions occur, together with their effect on the
type environment of the process under observation, , and the effect on the, possibly
different, type environment of the observing process, . This labelled transition system
is a generalisation of that used in [11] to characterise typed behavioural equivalences for
the π-calculus. There judgements take the simpler form
  P µ−→ ′  P ′
in which the type environment of the observed process, namely , and changes to this
environment, remain implicit. Our characterisation theorems would also be expressed in
terms of these more abstract judgements, but the explicit use of the type environment of
the observed processes, the s, makes the statement of our non-interference results more
straightforward; see the formulations of Theorems 4.3 and 4.5.
Our second main result extends the non-interference result from [12], showing that
non-interference, with respect to both may and must testing, can be enforced using types.
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However it remains to be seen to what extent this approach, non-interference through types,
can be used to obtain useful instances of non-interference. For example in [8] a wide range
of security properties have been shown to be expressible in terms of non-interference and it
would be interesting to see whether these can be enforced by typing constraints using a type
system such as ours. This would involve extending our language to include cryptographic
primitives, such as those from [1], but we believe that this is not problematic.
A general overview of the use of static analysis techniques to enforce information-
flow policies may be found in [22]. Useful surveys of research into non-interference in
process languages are given in [6,21].1 Much of this work is behaviour based; systems are
deemed to be interference-free if their trace sets, sequences of actions labelled high or low,
satisfy certain properties. Here we use a more extensional approach, saying that a system
is interference-free if low-level observers are unable to discern the presence or absence of
high-level components. Such high-level definitions may be intuitively attractive but they
are not necessarily easy to deal with. So, for example, to obtain our non-interference
results we needed to give more intensional characterisations, in terms of sequences of
high- and low-level actions. Moreover our use of these characterisations, in the proofs
of our non-interference results, are very similar in nature some of the definitions of non-
interference given in [6,7]. For example the proof technique used in Theorem 4.3 recalls the
non-interference property called NDC in [6]. However a formal comparison is not straight-
forward; definitions, in papers such as [6,20,21] are for very simple untyped versions of
CCS or CSP, while we deal with the more expressive π-calculus.
However the main difference in the two approaches may be summarised as follows:
• wepropose validating a process for non-interference using syntax-directed typechecking
• in [6] and related work, a process is validated by checking semantics-based properties
such as trace sets.
In [15] a type system is given which guarantees non-interference with respect to an ex-
tension of the π-calculus; moreover non-interference is expressed with respect to a barbed
congruence. However the language used is a considerable extension of the π-calculus,
with operators for selection based input/output, based on disjunctive patterns, and it is the
behaviour of these operators which are mainly constrained by the type system. The types
used are also very sophisticated. Unlike ours, which are simply annotated versions of the
standard Pierce/Sangiorgi types [18] they track the use of channels, using annotated affine
and linear types, and capture causal relationships between actions by a partial composition
on these types, using ideas based on the graph types of [25].
Finally [5], which uses security labels attached to messages in the join calculus to
formulate non-interference, argues via an example for the use of a behavioural equivalence
stronger than may testing. The formulation uses weak barbed congruence but could have
equally well used must testing equivalence; indeed it is difficult to envisage a practical
scenario in which there is something to be gained from assuming attackers have the extra
power associated with the former rather than the latter. We have also already pointed out
(in Example 4.4) that the join calculus can not be used to express situations in which
there is read contention between different security levels. Nevertheless the approach used
to develop a type system for the join calculus for detecting information flow seems to be
quite general and may also be applicable to the asynchronous π-calculus.
1 For the use of types for other languages see [23].
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